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The US Supreme Court throughout the 20th century has been characterized as being divided
between liberals and conservatives, suggesting that justices with similar ideologies would have voted
similarly had they overlapped in tenure. What if they had? I build an empirical, quantitative model
of this counterfactual hypothesis using pairwise maximum entropy. I infer how 36 justices from
1946-2016 would have all voted on a Super Supreme Court. The model is strikingly consistent with
a standard voting model from political science despite using 105 less parameters and fitting the
observed statistics better. As with historical courts, the Super Court is dominated by consensus.
The rate at which consensus decays as more justices are included is extremely slow, nearly 100 years,
and indicates that the modern Supreme Court is an extremely stable institution. Beyond consensus,
I discover a rich structure of dissenting blocs that are distributed along a heavy-tailed Zipf’s law.
The heavy tail means that dominant dissenting modes fail to capture the entire spectrum of dissent.
Thus, I find that Supreme Court voting over time is not low-dimensional despite implications to
the contrary in historical analysis of Supreme Court voting. Although it has been long presumed
that strong higher order correlations are induced by features of the cases, the institution, and the
justices, I show that such complexity can be expressed in a minimal model relying only on pairwise
correlations. From the perspective of model selection, this minimal model may generalize better
and thus be useful for prediction of Supreme Court voting over time.
The modern US Supreme Court is often described as
being divided between liberal and conservative wings bal-
anced on the fulcrum of one or two swing voters [1–3].
In the 1930s, a similar dynamic was at work where a
conservative bloc known as the “Four Horsemen” relied
on a fifth swing vote to countermand policy designed to
ameliorate the economic impact of the Great Depression
[4]. Over time, political issues and the composition of the
Court have changed, but the idea that a left and right
divide characterizes voting on the Court is a widespread
observation in the literature [2, 5–8]. The implicit hy-
pothesis is that ideologically similar justices on different
courts would have voted similarly on the same cases, but
in reality they never faced the same cases nor voted with
the same set of colleagues. Although I could take similar
cases and then compare two justices’ votes [7, 9], a direct
approach would be to compare how the two vote with
a shared cohort to infer how the two might have voted
together.
The Supreme Court is the highest court in the US, con-
sisting of up to 9 sitting justices at any given time with
short periods where a seat is vacant. Each set of sitting
justices is known as a natural court. Unlike Congress
where all seats come up for reelection every few years,
Supreme Court justices are appointed for life and typi-
cally one justice is replaced at a time. Although a retiring
and an incoming justice may never have voted together,
they may both accumulate a number of votes with the
same 8 justices over many years and potentially many
more years with a smaller cohort. In a typical year, 90-
150 cases are decided with a vote (depending on the era)
[10, 11]. After choosing to consider a case, the Opin-
ion of the Court is decided by a majority and—although
there may be subtleties in the Opinion—the voting jus-
tices must in the end choose to join the majority or not,
and this binary code is used in the political science liter-
ature [12].
The long overlapping stints are informative about how
justices vote relative to each other. If the two pairs out
of three voters were highly correlated, then I would by
transitivity expect that the third pair likewise vote to-
gether. If, however, the two pairs were anticorrelated,
then the proverbial logic “the enemy of my enemy is my
friend” implies that the third pair is again correlated.
In general, there are an infinite number of models that
would match the observed pairs while filling in the miss-
ing ones. If I insist that the model match the observed
pairwise disagreements but otherwise make no further
assumptions, I have specified pairwise maximum entropy
(maxent) models. Maxent models by design make mini-
mal assumptions about the structure of the data and so
are not guaranteed to capture the statistics of political
voting with few parameters. I show, however, that they
do while remaining consistent with highly parameterized
spatial voting models from political science [13].
I build a pairwise maxent model of the joint voting
record of a Super Supreme Court of all 36 justices in
the modern Supreme Court Database from 1946-2016
(K = 8, 737) [8, 10]. Instead of ideological divisions, the
Super Court is dominated by unanimity even across tem-
porally separated justices, showing it to be an extremely
stable institution. Just from pairwise correlations, the
model generates a rich structure of dissenting blocs that
cannot be captured by a low-dimensional, ideological pic-
ture. This comparison of Supreme Court justices across
time is just one example of the comparative study of po-
litical institutions. I show how minimal models from sta-
tistical physics make quantitative predictions that could
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2be rigorously tested against alternative models or new
data.
THE MAXENT MODEL
I represent the vote of Justice i to be σi where
the binary nature of majority voting is represented by
σi ∈ {−1, 1}. The average agreement between two jus-
tices who voted Kij times together is measured by the
pairwise correlation
〈σiσj〉data =
Kij∑
n=1
σ
(n)
i σ
(n)
j
/
Kij. (1)
I specify that the model match the observed pairwise
correlations,
〈σiσj〉data = 〈σiσj〉 =
∑
σ
p(σ)σiσj (2)
where the model is the probability distribution p(σ) over
a vector of votes σ of all included justices. I must also
specify the average vote of each justice 〈σi〉. For nearly
all votes, the sign of the vote corresponds to whether
to affirm or to reverse the previous court’s ruling, but
the orientation is determined by the history of the case.
Since I focus on the pattern of internal agreement and
do not expect that to depend on whether the question
is formulated as “Is A constitutional?” or as “Is A un-
constitutional?”, I remove any bias by symmetrizing the
data set such that [8, 12]
〈σi〉data = 〈σi〉 = 0 (3)
Eqns 2 and 3 along with the principle of maximum en-
tropy specify the values of the remaining unobserved
pairwise correlations.
Entropy is the unique measure of uncertainty that
obeys simple rules for consistency [14, 15]. Maximizing
entropy S[p] = −∑σ p(σ) ln p(σ) while constraining the
distribution to match the pairwise correlations is equiv-
alent to minimizing the Helmholtz free energy [8, 16, 17]
− lnZ = 〈E〉 − S (4)
E(σ) = −
36∑
i<j
Jijσiσj (5)
where the Hamiltonian is formally equivalent to the Ising
spin glass and the couplings Jij can be thought of as
Langrangian multipliers enforcing Eq 2. The resulting
pairwise maximum entropy model has Boltzmann form
p(σ) = e−E(σ)
/
Z. (6)
Despite this equivalence, the maxent formalism requires
no assumptions about equilibrium, only that the pairwise
correlations are representative of some stationary distri-
bution p(σ) I wish to characterize.
For each 〈σiσj〉 I fix, I have a corresponding coupling Jij
that, in the strictest sense, only has probabilistic impli-
cations. A positive Jij lowers the energy E when the two
justices i and j vote together, increasing the probability
that I observe such a vote by a factor eJij . Disagreement
between i and j is suppressed by a factor e−Jij . Since
justices who never voted together have no correlations to
constrain, the corresponding coupling are not specified,
effectively setting Jij = 0. Although one might interpret
this to indicate the absence of real interaction, the precise
statement is that the predicted correlations are mediated
through the structure implied by the constrained corre-
lations. The couplings do not imply causal interaction
between the justices. If there were causal interactions,
then the consequences would be hidden in the pairwise
correlations along with any other effects like sampling bi-
ases. In other words, the only information in the model is
that available in the pairwise correlations and no more as
is explicitly imposed by the maximum entropy approach.
In the maxent model for the Super Court, the pair-
wise correlations are almost exclusively positive, con-
firming that the Supreme Court has always been dom-
inated by consensus. Out of the 248 observed pairwise
correlations, only 2 are negative—between WO Douglas
and WE Burger and between WO Douglas and WH
Rehnquist—hinting that WO Douglas is an unusual jus-
tice in the history of the Court. After solving the model I
can predict the hypothetical correlations between justices
who never served together, and even in this enlarged set
of possibilities the only further negative correlations are
between WO Douglas and conservatives SD O’Connor, W
Rehnquist, A Scalia, and C Thomas. Additionally, the
ideologically opposed pairs WJ Brennan and C Thomas,
T Marshall and WH Rehnquist, and T Marshall and C
Thomas are negatively correlated. Although these are
all small negative values, they are nevertheless promi-
nent because they are unusual in a political body that
prizes public agreement [4, 18]. Although the remain-
ing correlations are positive, the left-right divide is in-
dicated by stronger correlations within and weaker cor-
relations between ideological sides when the justices are
ordered by ideology (Appendix Figure 4). This tension
between competing blocs is reflected in the interaction
matrix Jij, where couplings of both signs are recovered
from our model of majority vs. minority voting.
W-NOMINATE MODEL
I compare the maxent model with a standard spatial
voting model from political science W-nominate (Ap-
pendix Section IV) [13]. Canonical spatial voting mod-
els assume that each justice is located in some low-
dimensional, policy space along with the positions for ev-
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FIG. 1. (left) Predicted pairwise correlations from pairwise maxent model are almost all positive. (middle) Inferred cou-
plings Jij. Pairs without any votes together in the data have Jij = 0. (right) Maxent model fits observed pairwise cor-
relations well compared to the the 10-dimensional W-Nominate model after adjustment for unanimous votes specified by
Eqns 8 and 9. For the maxent model, over 97% of the 197 fit correlations are within two standard errors of the mean given
Kij observations for justices i and j, δij =
√
(〈σiσj〉+ 1)(1− 〈σiσj〉)/4Kij, except for a few major deviations accounted for by
conflicting constraints (Appendix Section II). Maxent model predicts 4th, 6th, and 8th order correlations closely except some
strong deviations explained by short temporal fluctuations in the distribution of case types (Appendix Section III). For clarity,
only points with absolute error δij...k =
∣∣∣2√p(σi = σj = ... = σk)[1− p(σi = σj = ... = σk)]/Kij...k∣∣∣ > 0.25 have error bars.
ery case considered. In this model, each justice votes in-
dependently, log p(σ) =
∑
i log p(σi) ∝ −
∑
i βE(σi) with
inverse temperature parameter β, and correlations are in-
duced by similar positions in policy space. Given justice
i’s preferred policy position θid with distance from case
k, fkd(θi), along dimension d of a D-dimensional space,
every justice contributes to the total energy
Ei(σi) = − exp
(
−
D∑
d=1
w2dfkd(σi)
2/2
)
(7)
The parameters wd weight each dimension. Eq 7 stip-
ulates that when cases are located close to a justice’s
preferred policy position, justices are more likely to vote
for it than against it.
The standard W-Nominate model excludes votes in the
data where all justices voted together when fitting, so I
include the probability of Super Court unanimity given
by the pairwise maxent model punan by reweighting the
W-Nominate model such that a unanimous vote σu
p(σu)← p(σu)(1− punan) + punan (8)
while other votes
p(σ)← p(σ)(1− punan). (9)
Eq 8 does not fix the two models with the same p(σu)
because unanimous votes are generated with small prob-
ability by W-Nominate even though they are not fit (Ap-
pendix Section IV), but it does ensure that if the W-
Nominate model were like the maxent model beyond the
unanimous mode, the similarities would be readily ap-
parent.
The D = 10 spatial voting model referred to as Nom10
has > 105 parameters compared to < 103 for the pairwise
maxent model even though it is minimal compared to
other variations of spatial voting models. Despite this
large disparity in parameterization, the maxent model
fits the observed statistics of the data better as shown in
Figure 1. Nevertheless, both models show very similar
collective patterns.
STRONG CONSENSUS
Despite consisting of members from 24 nine-member
natural courts, the probability of unanimity on the Su-
per Court is an astounding 10% of the time. In compar-
ison, independent justices would vote unanimously with
a relatively minuscule probability of pu(k = 36) = 2
−36,
implying that the interactions impose strong collective
structure. As a stricter test of the strength of cohesion,
I might consider that justices already have an idea of
how the Court is leaning before they cast their vote. If
I instead imagine that each justice independently defects
from unanimity with probability pdef , I can measure for a
natural court of k′ = 9 that typically votes unanimously
about 36% of the time, pdef = 0.89. Extrapolating this I
find that the Super Court would vote unanimously with
probability pu(k = 36) = 0.015 [19]. This is an order of
magnitude below what I find on the Super Court. Thus,
4the Super Court shows a strong tendency to consensus
that spans the many natural courts it represents.
Even in a chain of tightly correlated voters the prob-
ability that justices agree with others far away becomes
dominated by drift [20]. Looking at Figure 1, I see that
pairwise correlations far from the diagonal tend to be
smaller than those closer, indicative of weaker correla-
tions spanning longer periods of time. To test this more
systematically, I consider the probability of unanimity in
blocs of size k, pu(k), and compare justices that sat to-
gether with random subsets in Figure 2. It is clear that
both models of independent justices decay much more
rapidly than what I find in the Super Court. In the limit
of large blocs of 20 or more justices, or roughly two dif-
ferent Supreme Courts, the unanimous mode begins to
decay like an exponential, indicating the regime of finite
correlation length. Here, adding a new justice is like
adding an independent voice to the system. The decay
length l, however, is 43 justices, roughly equivalent to a
century of justices. W-Nominate predicts a similar decay
length of 77 justices. Although the W-Nominate curve
is lifted because I included unanimity in Eq 8, its shape
which is not given is remarkably similar. In this quan-
titative sense, the Supreme Court is an extremely stable
and conservative institution.
The force quelling dissent, a “norm to consensus” [18],
is even stronger for justices that sit on the same court. I
again calculate the probability of unanimity for blocks of
size k, but only for justices who sat on the same natural
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Bloc of size k
10-1
100
p
u
(k
)
Same court
Diff. courts
p(k) = 2−k
p(k) = (1− pdef)k
Nom102 9
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
lo
g( pn
at
u
/p
d
if
f
u
)
FIG. 2. Decay length of consensus spans a century in the hy-
pothetical Super Court according to both maxent and Nom10
models. For the maxent model, the probability that all mem-
bers of a bloc of size k vote together pu(k) decays exponen-
tially when k > 20. A fit to these points has a decay length
of 43 justices (dashed black line) corresponding to nearly a
century of justices. I consider justices that sat on the same
court (blue), justices who did not (red), independent voters
(green), independent defectors from unanimity (cyan), and
the 10-dimensional W-Nominate model (magenta). (inset)
“Norm to consensus” energy term pushing individuals to una-
nimity grows linearly log(pnatu /p
diff
u ) ∝ 0.035k for justices in
the same natural court compared to justices who did not all
work together. Consensus energy outweighs the tendency for
unrelated justices to vote independently measured from the
exponential tail that grows as k/l = −0.023k.
court. As k increases from 2 to 9, the log-ratio of the
probability, or energy difference, of finding a unanimous
vote on a natural court pnatu compared to justices from
different courts pdiffu increases linearly with the bloc size
log
(
pnatu (k)/p
diff
u (k)
)
= Ediff(k) − Enat(k) ∝ 0.035k as I
show in Figure 2. This reveals a force encouraging the
formation of blocs and especially for consensus specific to
natural courts. Notably, the energy term for consensus
grows faster than the inverse decorrelation length in the
limit of large courts l−1 = −0.023 per justice. This sug-
gests that consensus would dominate even when random
justices who had never voted together are made to vote
together which is akin to the situation when new justices
are nominated into the Supreme Court.
ZIPF’S LAW: MANY WAYS TO DISSENT
Besides consensus, the pattern of dissenting blocs that
emerge from pairwise interactions are consistent with no-
tions of ideological blocs, but show much richer structure
than binary ideological division. Ordering votes by fre-
quency rank r, I find that Zipf’s law holds after the strong
unanimous mode [21, 22]
p(r) = (1− α)r−α/(rmin − rmax) (10)
where α = 0.85. The power law form with is clear over
4 orders of magnitude. This is consistent with previous
work on the Second Rehnquist Court, where we observed
a wide distribution of votes as measured from the data
over a limited range of ∼ 102 unique votes. There, a
power law fit yields α ≈ 1 [8].
The slow decay in the distribution with r signals that
there is no typical set of voting behavior. The Super
Court shows an extremely heavy-tailed distribution over
votes where even “rare” events happen relatively often.
In this sense, the intuitive notion that I could consider an
average ideological behavior of the Super Court is mis-
leading because even votes that defy this intuition are
probable.
If I were, however, to group votes together such that all
votes almost along ideological lines—where a few individ-
uals buck the line—I might remove the heavy tail and find
dominant clusters of “noisy” ideological votes that serve
as a useful, compressed description of the Super Court
[8, 23, 24]. A natural way of clustering votes is given by
the energy landscape constructed using Eq 5. By taking
a vote and flipping the single voter most likely to change
his or her vote at a time, I will eventually reach an en-
ergy minimum where no vote flip will lower the energy of
the vote. This defines an energy landscape where states
can be grouped by local energy minima. Since the energy
is directly related to the probability, log p(σ) ∝ −E(σ),
this procedure is equivalent to searching for local max-
ima in probability where single voter flips climb hills in
5FIG. 3. (circles) Distribution of votes σ obeys Zipf’s law
when ordered by rank r as in Eq 10. Symmetry about the
sign of the vote means that there are always two votes (one
the negative of the other) with the same probabilities. The
distribution is very heavy-tailed with exponent α = 0.9 ac-
cording to the maxent model. (triangles) Distribution over
energy basins follows a truncated power law (Eq 11) with
large cutoff λ = 340. Nom10 does not have a natural energy
landscape relating votes, but shows remarkable overlap when
assuming the maxent Hamiltonian in Eq 5.
a probability landscape. When I measure the probabil-
ity that the Super Court is located on a particular hill
of probability, I find again Zipf’s law but now with an
exponential cutoff
pbasin(r) ∝ r−αe−r/λ (11)
with α = 1.1 and λ = 340. The exponential cutoff means
that the clusters of noisy prototypical votes can indeed
be summarized by dominant modes, but the size of the
cutoff means the modes are many.
Although I cannot construct an energy landscape for
W-Nominate in the same way because there are no ex-
plicit couplings between voters, if I were to assume that
its energy landscape were structured similarly I should
recover the same truncated Zipf’s law using Eq 5. As I
show in Figure 3, the resulting distribution over basins
is remarkably similar. In comparison, random, indepen-
dent voters show strong deviations from Eq 11 because
they are randomly scattered across the entire extent of
energy basins.
The large number of energy minima is in stark contrast
with the Second Rehnquist Court where there are only
six meaningful clusters despite being a quarter of the size
of the Super Court [8]. This comparison, however, is mis-
leading. For spin glasses, systems with many frustrated
interactions as with the Super Court, the number of max-
ima grows exponentially with system size [17, 25], so the
idea that the number of maxima scales linearly with size
is strongly mistaken. This pattern is reflected in the
eigenvalue spectrum of the covariance matrix Cij = 〈σiσj〉
(Appendix Section IV) [5]. By calculating the spectrum
on random subsets of N from the Super Court, I find the
eigenvalues ordered by rank r have the scale-free form
λ(r) = NαΛ(rN−α) (12)
with α = 0.8. This means that there is no natural length
scale at which to cut off the spectrum because every mode
reveals another level of complexity in Super Court voting.
Dominant modes of voting are indeed useful and accu-
rate descriptions of voting on natural courts because the
systems are small [3, 5]. Yet a low-dimensional represen-
tation of collective voting over time misses the heavy tail
generating a rich range of behavior.
DISCUSSION
Although voting in a political context is complex,
such collective phenomena are natural to approach from
the perspective of statistical physics [17, 24, 26–28].
Voting on the Supreme Court shows strong collective
effects—often obscured by the focus on individual ide-
ology [2, 7, 18]—that I exploit by using observations of
justices that voted together to infer how justices who
never did might have (Figure 1). I find that the hypo-
thetical Super Court is dominated by strong consensus
that nearly spans a century (Figure 2), an observation
that may be surprising to Supreme Court scholars [29].
Hiding beneath this dominant mode is a rich range of dis-
senting coalitions (Figure 3), illustrating the hypothetical
behavior of historically disjoint groups of justices. The
remarkable similarity in the distribution of states beyond
the unanimous mode of the maxent and W-Nominate
models suggests that they are largely capturing the same
collective structure encoded in the maxent energy land-
scape.
Consideration of such hypothetical situations has long
played a significant role in legal research. Legal scholars
study the influence of past precedents by using written
opinions as sources of legal reasoning for justices in the
future [4]. Political scientists compare justices by con-
sidering similarities and differences between the issues
brought up in cases [30]. These alternative approaches
for finding correlations across time are ways of indirectly
testing the predictions of this model. A direct quanti-
tative test might be for forecasting where the temporal
structure captured by the pairwise maxent model might
find immediate application in the prediction of Supreme
Court votes [31].
In contrast to binary ideological intuition obtained
from news about the Supreme Court, the collective be-
havior of the Court over time reveals an institution fo-
cused on consensus and insulated from the seemingly
rapid pace of political change. When I look beyond
consensus, ideological intuition fails again if I account
for the changing composition of the Court: ideologi-
cal modes are lost amongst the cacophony of dissenting
6voices. As we know from statistical physics, even simple
models can generate an incredibly rich range of behavior
when there are many competing, frustrated interactions
[32, 33]. From the perspective of statistical physics, I
show that this intuition is expressed in the complex vot-
ing patterns of the Supreme Court.
I thank Paul Ginsparg, Bryan Daniels, and Colin
Clement for invaluable feedback and Bill Bialek, Guru
Khalsa, and Ti-Yen Lan for comments on previous ver-
sions of the manuscript. I acknowledge funding from the
NSF Graduate Research Fellowship under grant DGE-
1650441.
[1] Bernard Grofman and Timothy J Brazill. Identify-
ing the median justice on the Supreme Court through
multidimensional scaling: Analysis of “natural courts”
1953–1991. Public Choice, 112(1-2):55–79, 2002.
[2] Andrew D Martin, Kevin M Quinn, and Lee Epstein.
The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court.
NCL Rev, 83:1275, 2004.
[3] Brian L Lawson, Michael E Orrison, and David T Umin-
sky. Spectral Analysis of the Supreme Court. Math Mag,
79(5):340, December 2006.
[4] Melvin I Urofsky. Dissent and the Supreme Court. Its
Role in the Court’s History and the Nation’s Constitu-
tional Dialogue. Vintage, January 2017.
[5] Lawrence Sirovich. A pattern analysis of the second
Rehnquist US Supreme Court. PNAS, 100(13):7432–
7437, 2003.
[6] Charles Kemp and Joshua B Tenenbaum. The discovery
of structural form. PNAS, 105(31):10687–10692, 2008.
[7] Jeffrey A Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M Cameron, and
Harold J Spaeth. Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices Revisited. J of Politics, October
2015.
[8] Edward D Lee, Chase P Broedersz, and William Bialek.
Statistical Mechanics of the US Supreme Court. J Stat
Phys, pages 1–27, April 2015.
[9] C Neal Tate. Personal attribute models of the voting
behavior of US Supreme Court justices: Liberalism in
civil liberties and economics decisions, 1946–1978. Am
Political Sci Rev, 75:355–367, 1981.
[10] Harold J Spaeth, Lee Epstein, Andrew D Martin, Jef-
frey A Segal, Theodore W Ruger, and Sara C Benesh.
2017 Supreme Court Database.
[11] Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court
at Work.
[12] Daniel E Ho and Kevin M Quinn. How Not to Lie with
Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, Measurement, and Mod-
els. California Law Review, 98(3):813–876, 2010.
[13] Keith T Poole and Howard Rosenthal. A Spatial Model
for Legislative Roll Call Analysis. Am J of Political Sci,
29(2):357, May 1985.
[14] Claude Elwood Shannon. A Mathematical Theory of
Communication. The Bell System Technical Journal,
27:379–423, July 1948.
[15] Thomas M Cover and Joy A Thomas. Elements of In-
formation Theory. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, 2nd
edition, 2006.
[16] E T Jaynes. Information Theory and Statistical Mechan-
ics. Phys Rev, 106(4):620, May 1957.
[17] W S Bialek. Biophysics: Searching for Principles. Prince-
ton University Press, 2012.
[18] Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A Segal, and Harold J Spaeth. The
norm of consensus on the US Supreme Court. Am J of
Political Sci, pages 362–377, May 2010.
[19] I use the probability of unanimity of a group of size k′
to estimate the probability that a single justice defects
pdef = 1−p1/k
′
u (k
′). The probability of no defections with
k independently defecting justices is pu(k) = (1− pdef)k
as in Figure 2.
[20] E Ising. Beitrag zur Theorie des Ferromagnetismus. PhD
thesis, December 1924.
[21] MEJ Newman. Power laws, Pareto distributions and
Zipf’s law. Contemp Phys, 46(5):323–351, September
2005.
[22] David J Schwab, Ilya Nemenman, and Pankaj Mehta.
Zipf’s Law and Criticality in Multivariate Data without
Fine-Tuning. Phys Rev Lett, 113(6):068102, August 2014.
[23] J J Hopfield. Neural networks and physical systems
with emergent collective computational abilities. PNAS,
79(8):2554–2558, April 1982.
[24] Elad Schneidman, Michael J Berry II, Ronen Segev,
and William Bialek. Weak pairwise correlations imply
strongly correlated network states in a neural population.
Nature, 440(20):1007–1012, 2006.
[25] A J Bray and M A Moore. Metastable states, inter-
nal field distributions and magnetic excitations in spin
glasses. J. Phys. C: Solid State Phys., 14(19):2629–2664,
July 1981.
[26] Roger Guimera` and Marta Sales-Pardo. Justice Blocks
and Predictability of U.S. Supreme Court Votes. PLoS
ONE, 6(11):e27188, November 2011.
[27] Bryan C Daniels, David C Krakauer, and Jessica C Flack.
Control of finite critical behaviour in a small-scale social
system. Nat Comms, 8:14301–8, February 2017.
[28] W Bialek, A Cavagna, and I Giardina. Social interac-
tions dominate speed control in poising natural flocks
near criticality. PNAS, 2014.
[29] T G Walker, L Epstein, and WJ Dixon. On the mys-
terious demise of consensual norms in the United States
Supreme Court. J of Politics, 50(2):361–389, 1988.
[30] L Baum. Comparing the Policy Positions of Supreme
Court Justices from Different Periods. Political Res Q,
42(4):509–521, December 1989.
[31] Daniel Martin Katz, Michael J Bommarito, and Josh
Blackman. A general approach for predicting the be-
havior of the Supreme Court of the United States. PLoS
ONE, 12(4):e0174698–18, April 2017.
[32] David Sherrington and Scott Kirkpatrick. Solvable Model
of a Spin-Glass. Phys Rev Lett, 35(26):1792–1796, De-
cember 1975.
[33] Hidetoshi Nishimori. Statistical Physics of Spin Glasses
and Information Processing. An Introduction. Clarendon
Press, 2001.
